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The recent case of Nieuwoudt & another NNO v Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk
2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) has raised questions regarding the applicability of
the doctrine of constructive notice and the so-called Turquand rule to trusts.
The doctrine of constructive notice and the Turquand rule form part of
the common law governing companies.
In terms of the law of agency a third party dealing with a person
purporting to act as an agent cannot hold the principal liable on the ground
of ostensible authority (ie estoppel) if he, the third party, knew (had ‘notice’
of) the ‘agent’s’ lack of authority. The courts brought the fact of the public
character of the company’s constitution within the framework of this rule of
agency by reasoning that a person transacting with a company is deemed to
have notice of any restriction upon a director or officer’s authority which is
contained in the company’s articles. This is the doctrine of constructive
notice. The public character of the articles of association is taken into
account on the theory that they constitute a type of notice to third parties
limiting any ostensible authority that a director might have. Thus, in Ernest v
Nicholls (1857) 6 HL Cas 401 at 409, Lord Wensleydale held:
‘All persons, therefore, must take notice of the [registered] documents . . . If they do not choose to
acquaint themselves with the powers of the directors, it is their own fault, and if they give credit to any
unauthorized persons they must be contented to look to them only, and not to the company at large.
The stipulations of the [registered documents], which restrict and regulate their authority, are
obligatory on those who deal with the company; and the directors can make no contract so as to bind
the whole body of shareholders, for whose protection the rules are made, unless they are strictly
complied with.’
The doctrine of constructive notice thus deems a person dealing with a
company to have knowledge of all internal formalities required by its
memorandum and articles. But because such person would not know
whether there has in fact been compliance with such internal formalities,
the so-called Turquand rule operates in favour of that person. The rule
provides that a person dealing with a company is entitled (subject to certain
limitations) to assume that the internal formalities as set out in the articles
have been complied with. There is no duty on such a person to enquire
whether the formalities have been complied with. Thus, the Turquand rule
‘was enunciated by the courts to mitigate the effects of the constructive
notice doctrine’ (P L Davies Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 6ed
(1997) 221).
The Turquand rule arose out of Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 119
ER 886 (Ex Ch) (6 E & B 327; [1843–1860] All ER Rep 435) and is also
referred to as the ‘indoor management rule’. In Nieuwoudt’s case the court
approved as a modern formulation of the rule what was taken from
Halsbury’s Laws of England 2ed vol 5 para 698, and approved by Lord
Simonds in Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459 at 474, which is as follows:
‘[P]ersons contracting with a company and dealing in good faith may
assume that acts within its constitution and powers have been properly and
duly performed, and are not bound to inquire whether acts of internal
management have been regular.’
Important for purposes of this note is that the court in Nieuwoudt’s case
(per Harms JA) questioned (in passing) the judgment in MAN Truck & Bus
(SA) Ltd v Victor 2001 (2) SA 562 (NC) where it was held that the Turquand
rule applies to trusts.
In the Man Truck case a trustee had entered into a suretyship agreement
without the knowledge and consent of his fellow trustee. The court ruled
that the lack of consent was no defence to a claim based on the suretyship
agreement because the act of obtaining the co-trustee’s consent was an act
of internal management and the claimant, on the basis of the Turquand rule,
was entitled to assume that the act had been duly and properly performed.
In Nieuwoudt’s case one of the two trustees (the appellants) of a trust had
signed a contract on behalf of the trust. The other party to the contract, a
close corporation, ceded its rights to the contract to the respondent. Clause
23.4 of the trust deed provided: ‘Die trustees kan een of meer van hulle
magtig om alle dokumente vir amptelike doeleindes wat vir die
administrasie van die trust en ter uitvoering van enige transaksie wat met
die trust se sake verband hou, nodig is, namens die trustees te teken’ (‘The
trustees may empower one or more of their number to sign, on behalf of
the trustees, all official documents necessary to the administration of the
trust and the execution of any transaction in connection with the trust’s
affairs’).
The appellants argued that in terms of the trust deed, where there were
only two trustees (as was the case) all decisions of trustees had to be
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unanimous, and as the second trustee’s approval of the contract had not
been obtained, the contract was invalid.
In response, the respondent argued that the representative of the close
corporation (one Fourie) had at no stage been informed by the appellants
that there were two trustees, or that two trustees had to sign the contract.
The appellants also did not provide Fourie with a copy of the trust deed.
The respondent alleged further that the fact that only one trustee signed the
contract did not provide a defence for the appellants. According to the
respondent this was so because clause 23.4 of the trust deed provided that
the trustees could empower one of their number to sign documents on
their behalf, to implement any transaction in connection with the trust’s
affairs. It was further argued that the respondent had not been in the
position, nor was it expected, to enquire into the internal prerequisites for
authority, for example, for a decision by the trustees. In this regard, the
respondent relied on the Turquand rule.
Farlam JA, who presented the court’s judgment in which the other four
judges concurred, rejected the respondent’s argument. He held (at
492B–E):
‘In my view, however, whether or not the Turquand rule should be applied to trusts, particularly
business trusts — a matter on which I express no opinion — it cannot be applied in the present case. I
say this because I am satisfied that clause 23.4 of the trust deed does not afford a foundation for the
contention advanced in this regard by the respondent . . .
The clause clearly, on its plain language, applies only to the signing of documents for official
purposes. It thus does not apply to the contract signed by the first appellant which was not for official
purposes. It follows that no question of internal formalities, such as is dealt with by the Turquand rule,
can be regarded as having arisen whereby an outsider who had concluded a contract with one of the
trustees could assume that, in signing the contract, the trustee concerned had been empowered, as a
matter of internal management, by his co-trustee to sign the contract.’
Farlam JA thus ruled that the respondents had misinterpreted clause 23.4
and went on to say (at 492G) that it was unnecessary to consider whether
the Turquand rule would have applied if the respondent’s interpretation had
been correct.
Farlam JA’s judgment throws little light on the applicability of the
Turquand rule to trusts. Harms JA (who concurred in Farlam JA’s judgment)
in a separate judgment (the other four judges concurring) does, however,
do so and also raises questions about the role of the doctrine of constructive
notice in relation to trusts.
Regarding the doctrine of constructive notice, Harms JA voiced some
concern. He referred (at 493–J) to the fact that there is no central register
for trusts or trustees as one has in respect of companies and close
corporations. He pointed to the fact that a member of the public wishing to
do business with a trust would first have to determine in which Master’s
office the trust deed has been filed and having done so would then have to
make application to the Master for permission to inspect the trust deed,
something the Master in the exercise of his or her discretion may refuse. He
referred (at 494B) to s 18 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988,
which provides as follows:
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‘Subject to the provisions of s 5(2) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 regarding the
documents in connection with the estate of a deceased person, the Master shall upon written request
and payment of the prescribed fee furnish a certified copy of any document under his control relating
to trust property to a trustee, his surety or his representative or any other person who in the opinion of
the Master has sufficient interest in such document.’
After stating that whether knowledge of the contents of a trust deed
should be attributed in law to the public seems to be ‘less than obvious’ he
said (at 494C):
‘An underlying principle of company law and the Turquand rule, namely that a person who deals with
a company is bound by the limitations contained in the memorandum and articles of association
because these documents are accessible to the public, is consequently difficult to apply to trusts.’
Despite his uneasiness with the applicability of the doctrine of
constructive notice to trusts, Harms JA held (at 494D–E) that: ‘all this does
not justify a departure from the principle that trustees have to act jointly [he
referred in this regard, with approval, to Coetzee v Peet Smith Trust 2003 (5)
SA 647 (T)]. And one should not believe, as Cameron et al Honoré’s South
African Law of Trusts 5 ed para 198 point out, that the ambit of authority
conferred by a trust deed is a matter of ‘‘internal management’’ with which
outsiders need not concern themselves.’
The effect of what Harms JA is saying appears to be that, although the
doctrine of constructive notice is not apposite in relation to trusts, a third
party dealing with a trust cannot plead ignorance of the ambit of the
authority of trustees. Such a principle, accordingly, has a similar effect to the
doctrine of constructive notice. If this is so, it raises the question whether a
Turquand-type rule is not apt, bearing in mind that the Turquand rule is there
‘to mitigate the effects of the constructive notice doctrine’ (Davies op cit
221).
Regarding the applicability of the Turquand rule to trusts, Harms JA’s
judgment, although, with respect, a little unclear, appears to reject the
possibility, at least in respect of the delegation of authority. He says (at
494G):
‘What does need to be emphasised is that even if the Turquand rule is extended to business trusts, and
even if a trust deed were to provide that the trustees could delegate their powers to one of their
number, the Turquand rule would without more [emphasis added] be of no assistance to third parties.
This is because a third party would not be entitled to assume, merely from the fact that one trustee can
be authorised to exercise the powers of all of them, that such authorisation has in fact been given.’
Harms JA did not directly disagree with the decision in the MAN Truck
case and his only reference (at 494F) to the case is to say: ‘Whether, on the
facts of the case, the issue in MAN Truck . . . concerned the ambit of
authority . . . or a matter of internal management need not be considered.’
He referred to the fact that Cameron et al suggest that it concerned the
ambit of authority. (Cameron et al Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5 ed
(2002) para 198 are adamant in this regard and view the MAN Truck
decision as ‘contrary to both principle and authority’. They refer to Edinburg
v Mercantile Credit 1980 (1) SA 744 (ZH) 746–7) and are of the opinion that
the decision ‘must be discountenanced’. They are of the view that the
decision was reached ‘with no allusion to trust law principles or authorities’
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and ‘disregarded beneficiaries’ interests while overlooking the fact that
outsiders dealing with a trust know that they are not dealing with a
company’ (Cameron et al op cit para 53n437).)
What is not clear from Harms JA’s judgment is what was meant by the
words ‘the Turquand rule would without more [emphasis added] be of no
assistance to third parties’ (see quote above). He does refer in the next
paragraph of the judgment to the possibility of the doctrine of estoppel
protecting a person who contracts with a trust, so perhaps what was meant
was that if the requirements of estoppel are met, then that, together with
the Turquand rule, would provide assistance to third parties. But does that
make sense? Does estoppel on its own not provide an independent remedy
for third parties? How would estoppel and the Turquand rule together
provide assistance?
There is of course the view (see the Australian case of Northside
Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General (1990) 170 CLR 146; (1990) 2
ACSR 161 (HC of A)) that the Turquand rule is not an independent rule of
law but an adjunct to the doctrine of estoppel, and so perhaps that is what
Harms JA is referring to. According to this view, all that the Turquand rule
does to protect a third party is to provide that a person who made no
enquiries is not thereby prevented from proving an estoppel. For example,
if a trust deed provides that a trustee, Mr A, can contract on behalf of the
trust if he has the consent of the other trustee, Mr B, and Mr B has not
given his consent to a contract entered into by Mr A with a third party but
has made a representation to the third party that he has given his consent,
then the third party will be protected by the doctrine of estoppel (assuming
the other requirements thereof have been met), even though he has made
no enquiry as to whether Mr A had actually obtained the consent of Mr B.
(See also J McLennan ‘The ultra vires doctrine and the Turquand rule in
company law —A suggested solution (1979) 94 SALJ 329 at 348, who says:
‘Lord Justice Diplock’s analysis [in Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB
480 (CA); [1964] 1 All ER 630], and particularly his formulation of condition (4), put the entire problem
into perspective. The truth emerges that the Turquand rule is not a positive rule of the law: it has a purely
negative operation and does not come into play unless the basic requirements of estoppel have been
met . . . The Turquand rule is not a substitute for the fundamental principles of the law of agency.’)
There is strong argument, however, that the Turquand rule is not part of
estoppel and exists as an independent sui generis rule (see M S Blackman, R
D Jooste, & G K Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act Vol 1 (2002)
4–46 to 4–49). It is doubtful too, judging from what he says about the
Turquand rule and estoppel, that Harms JA was referring to the contrary
view when referring to ‘the Turquand rule without more’. The ‘something
more’ he is referring to appears to be something entirely independent of the
Turquand rule.
Perhaps all that Harms JA was saying was that the third party will be
protected only by estoppel (as an independent sui generis rule). This is
supported by the fact that in the next paragraph he says (at 494I–J):
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‘However, as mentioned by Farlam JA, the fact that trustees have to act jointly does not mean that the
ordinary principles of the law of agency do not apply. The trustees may expressly or impliedly
authorise someone to act on their behalf and that person may be one of the trustees. There is no reason
why a third party may not act on the ostensible authority of one of the trustees, but whether a
particular trustee has the ostensible authority to act on behalf of the other trustees is a matter of fact and
not one of law.’
It is to be noted that the applicability of the Turquand rule to trusts was
rejected by the Full Bench of the Transvaal High Court in an obiter dictum
in Parker NO v Land and Agricultural Bank of SA [2003] 1 All SA 258 (T) at
264c. Kirk-Cohen J, who delivered the judgment of the court, referring to
the decision in the MAN Truck case, said:
‘Counsel for the respondent, in my view quite correctly, argued this aspect dubitante in view of the
criticism of that decision in Honoré’s South African Law of Trusts 5 ed by Cameron, De Waal and Wunsh
at 34 (paragraph 16), at 95 (paragraph 53) and 324–325 (paragraph 198). I agree with this criticism of
the Man Truck case (supra) that the Turquand rule, applicable to companies as separate legal personae,
cannot be applied to trusts.’
There is no reference to Parker’s case in the two judgments in Nieuwoudt’s
case, although it was referred to by counsel.
In Parker’s case, the trust deed required a minimum of three trustees to be
in office at all times. At a time when there were only two trustees, the two
trustees purported to conclude a contract on behalf of the trust. The
respondent nevertheless sought to hold the trust to the contract on the basis
that the peremptory requirement of three trustees constituted an internal
arrangement, the knowledge whereof was privy only to the remaining
trustees without any opportunity for the respondent to acquire knowledge
thereof. Ergo, it was argued that the trust was bound by the documents
executed.
The court found that the basis for invoking the Turquand rule, ie
ignorance of the contents of the trust deed and the requirements thereof,
did not apply in the case. This was because at the time the contract was
concluded, the respondent was in possession of the trust deed. Kirk-Cohen
J’s comments regarding the non-applicability of the Turquand rule were
accordingly obiter.
CONCLUSION
Harms JA’s judgment in Nieuwoudt’s case has brought into focus the dangers
that lie in transacting with a trust. Third parties dealing with trusts have to
be on their guard. As Harms JA said in Nieuwoudt’s case (at 495A): ‘This case
should consequently serve as a warning to everyone who deals with a trust
to be careful.’ The warning is most relevant in relation to business trusts
(and it was in connection with business trusts that Harms JA’s concern lay
— see 493E) but the law in this regard applies equally to all trusts.
Although the law is by no means settled, it appears, if Harms JA’s
judgment is anything to go by, that the Supreme Court of Appeal, when it
is called upon to pronounce on the matter, is unlikely to entertain a third
party’s plea of ignorance of the ambit of a trustee’s authority or countenance
any Turquand-type protection of third parties.
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It is hoped that the legal position will soon be clarified, taking into
account the interests of all parties — the trustees, the trust beneficiaries and
third parties. A willy-nilly adoption of company law doctrines is not the
answer. A solution that takes into account the fact that the nature of a trust
is sui generis, but that a business trust is in many respects similar to a
company, needs to be developed. Sight too must not be lost of the
non-public nature of inter vivos trusts and the need in the business world
for the swift conclusion of dealings, unhampered by delays in seeking
confirmation that internal requirements have been complied with.
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